Theresourceallocationimpliedbytheaboveequilibrium,whilesatisfyingtheParetocondition,takesaninterestingformwhichhasyettobeobserved:Therearemanytenantsworkingononefarmwitheachtenantmittingatrivialamountoflabor;eachtenantworksonmanyfarms,,thisisidenticalwiththeformunderwhicheachtenantmitsallhislaborinputstoonefarm,weneverobservetenantsdispersingtheirinputsamongmanyfarmsasdescribedbecausetransactioncosts,andinparticularthecostofcontractingandthecostofmovingfromfarmtofarm,arenotzero.
[1].Inalessprehensiveform,thisisanalternativeexpressionoftheresultsobtainedinchapter2.
[2].Supposethemarginaltenantreceiptcurvesrisebeforefalling,,thetenant(whoisnowentirelyfreetochoose)willdispersehistotalinputsuntiltheaveragetenantreceipt,(q/t)(1-r),foreachfarmisatamaximum,portionsunderlinearhomogeneity.
Indeed,underprivateownershipofresources,itisdifficulttod,however,aninterestingsetofconditionsforpositionAcanbespecified:(a)thatlandownershipbelongstothestateandthegovernmentarbi-trarilyassignslandtotenantswithrentscollectedonasharebasis;(b)thatthetenantisfreetoworkelsewhereatamarketwagerateandtheamountoflaborheusesonthestatelandisnotstipulated;and(c)tha,itappearsthatequilibriumwillbeatA,andtheresidualearningsforthegovernmenttenantsaresimilarto”welfare”veinmind.
[3].Iftheindustrysupplyoftenantlaborisrising,,andthewagerateusedinfigure5istheonefinallydeterminedinthemarket.
www.youxs.org
etenancyin1950,Chinesewritersmade,attacksonfarmingundertenancyweremon,andt,www.youxs.org.[1]
Theaforementionedfindings,inadequateastheymayseem,constitutethemostprehensivebodyofevidencerelatingtoagricult,togetherwithfindingsfromelsewhereinAsia,,however,thatineveryinstanceweuseonlydatacollectedfromperiodsandlocationswheretheexistingsystemofpropertyrightsconformst,thepostwarfarmlandreformsruleouttheuseofAsianagriculturaldataofthepasttwentyyearsinthispartofthestudy.
Applyingtheimplicationsofalternativetheoriesofsharetenancytoobservations,wecanperformseveralsimpletests.
Accordingtothestandardtheoryofsharetenancyderivedinchapter2,giventheproductionfunction,therentalpercentaged,weshouldobserveahigherrentalper-centageif(a)thelandismorefertileor(b)thecostoftenantinputsislower.[2]Evidenceconfirmingthishypothesisisstrong:
www.youxs.org(1921-25),www.youxs.org:
Asrentthetenantgivesthelandlordone-halfofthegrainandstrawfromwheatandriceland,two-fifthsofthegrainandstrawfromricelandonly,andthree-tenthsofthegrainandstrawfrompoorland.[3]
Likewise,itwasobservedinKweichowProvince(1929-30)that:
,foruppergradelandtherentalshareis60percent;formediumgrade50percent;andforlowergrade40percent.[4]
Casualobservationsaside,numericaldatashowingthesamepatternswerecollectedbytheLegislativeYuan(China,1930)andtheDepartmentofInternalAffairs(China,1932).[5]ThefindingsofthelatterhavebeenputedandplacedinAppendixB,becausetheyenpasstwenty-twoprovincesinChinawithsevengradesofland.
www.youxs.org.[6]Thisimpliesthathigherrentalpercentagesweregenerallyassociatedwiththemorefertilepaddyfieldsunderafreemarket.